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There is space only to note two other points on which I w ant to keep a d istance from th is view.
(1) On perfectly general grounds, it would be ab su rd to deny th a t Plato's thinking develops. B ut how m uch of the conflict between passages should be credited to his having changed h is th in k in g and how m uch to the fact th a t he is addressing w hat he projects as changed or different readers, in p articu lar, read ers a t different stages in th e psychagogical process of becom ing philosophical?
S triking th e appropriate balance between these possibilities m u st be a co n sta n t ta sk for th e interpreter. (2) The developmental view tends to be accom panied by th e assum ption th a t passages in the dialogues are (to quote C harles Kahn, "Plato an d S ocrates in the P rotagoras." M éthexis Í [1988] , pp. 33-52) "transparent" to Plato's thinking, directly conveying, as it were, h is cu rren t thinking. B ut th is m isses w hat Kahn calls th e literary "opacity" of th e dialogues, an opacity connected w ith th e way they are intended more to elicit and provoke in sig h t in th e read er th a n to s ta te doctrine system atically. To come to w hat Plato held tru e, we m u st first w ork o u r way through (what we can reco n stru ct of) the insights he intended to elicit in h is reader, an d to do this we m u st a ttu n e ourselves to the dram atic ch aracter of th e dialogues an d its specific m odes and powers of com m unication. (For an introductory account of these, see th e Introduction to my P lato 's PARMENIDES. Princeton, 1986 [hereafter PP] ).
collection and division-he m akes explicit the composite character and relational sta tu s the forms m ust have as the objects of logos. But we would throw out the baby with the bathw ater, I think, if we took all th is to imply th at he gives up the notion of the forms as partless ones. On the contrary, I shall try to show th a t Plato holds th a t logos can bring forms to light a s composite and as relata only insofar as they also have a presence prior to th is, a presence in which, quite the contrary, they show themselves as incomposite and, in th eir self-sufficiency, independent of relations.
My long-term project is to study the ways Plato both m ounts and invites his readers to th in k through th is apparent contradiction, transform ing it into a positive insight. This paper, an exam ination of the closing aporiai in the T heaetetus. is th e first step. The T heaetetus. in tu rn , is linked by the unity of dram atic action with th e Sophist and the Statesm an4 and, again, by recollective allusion with the Parm enides5. The Parm enides and the S tatesm an, in th eir tu rn s, are each linked in manifold ways to the Philebus. I th in k these various connections point the way through a subtle, surprisingly well-integrated reflection on simplicity and complexity and, distinctly, self-sufficiency and relatedness in th e forms. In later papers, I will move on from the T heaetetus. pursuing th is reflection through the relevant passages in these other dialogues.
I. The Closing Anoriai in the THEAETETUS: simplicity and complexity
Judged on its face, the Theaetetus is an unlikely locus for insights into forms. Nowhere in the dialogue are the forms explicitly invoked or discussed. From the beginning Socrates resists defining knowledge in term s of what it takes as its objects (see 146e); he proceeds, instead, in the contrary direction, letting the object of knowledge take shape as a function of the requirem ents of knowing. Moreover, Plato h as Socrates restrict him self to T heaetetus' proposed definitions of knowledge, and it has not yet occurred to Theaetetus, though he is an accomplished and theoretically inclined m athem atician, th a t the proper objects of knowledge might not be sense-perceptible entities. Nonetheless, on two counts th e Theaetetus is the fitting starting-point for my larger project. First and in general, the T heaetetus is "proleptic" to the other dialogues ju s t noted, in which the forms are explicitly invoked and 3I will d iscu ss th e non-bifurcatory version of collection an d division th a t is practiced a t th e end of the S tatesm an an d given a general methodological description in th e Philebus in "The GodGiven Way: Reflections on Method and th e Good in th e Later Plato," to be presented in th e Boston A rea C olloquium in A ncient Philosophy in April.
4See Theaetetus 210d. Sophist 216a. Statesm an 257a. 311c. 5See T heaetetus 183e-184a. I have discussed this in my comment on Diskin Clay's "Gaps in the 'U niverse' of th e Platonic Dialogues," Proceedings of th e Boston Area Colloquium in A ncient Philosophy, vol. Ill Í1988) . d p . 159-160. discussed; it raises problems and initiates responses to them th a t recur and are developed and deepened in those other texts.6 Second and more particularly, the final p art of the T heaetetus. 201c-210a, raises problems regarding ju s t the features of the objects of knowledge th a t those other dialogues pursue with regard to forms. Socrates attacks T heaetetus' final definition of knowledge by putting forth, then refuting, the notorious "dream" theoiy. The theory centers around the idea of perceptible "elements" th at, taken ju s t a s they are in them selves, are each partless and w ithout relation to anything else; th e refutation th en brings out ways in which the possibility of knowledge appears both to call for and to contradict such a conception of its object. The structural congruence of the "elements" in the theoiy and the forms m akes th e final p art of the T heaetetus especially im portant for my project.7
That séiid, let u s follow the T heaetetus' own lead and set the notion of forms into abeyance, turning instead to the dialogue's question of what knowledge is and w hat character and structure it requires of its object, as this is taken up at 201c-210a. The passage has plenty of obscurity, quite apart from any question of forms, to preoccupy us. It centers on Theaetetus' final definition of knowledge, as "true judgm ent with a logos" (τήν ... μ ε τά λό γο υ ά λ η θ η δόξαν, 201c9-dl). Socrates first wins Theaetetus' approval for his interpretive restatem ent of the definition in his "dream," then refutes it with a dilemma-only then, surprisingly, to pass directly and without explanation to the proposal of three senses of logos and a refutation of the proposed definition under each of the three interpretations. Retracing his steps, we should be puzzled at a num ber of points. If the dilemma is decisive, why does he pass on to the introduction of the three senses of logos? How are these two phases of his refutation-his rejection of the "dream" and his rejections of each sense of logos-related? Again, how, if at 6The concept of "proleptic" relations between dialogues is proposed by C. K ahn in h is "Plato's C harm ides a n d th e Proleptic Reading of Socratic Dialogues," The Jo u rn a l of Philosophy LXXXV, 10 (October 1988), pp. 541-549, an d richly qualified by C. Griswold in h is stim ulating com mentary, an ab stra c t of which is published in th e sam e volume, pp. 550-551. One of Griswold's key challenges is th a t th e "partiality [of proleptic passages] is n o t com pleted by o th er dialogues so m uch a s by the reader's reflection on the whole n atu re of th e m a tter discussed" (p. 551). I th in k th is in sig h t should be tak en less as an objection th a n a s a n appropriate com plem ent an d com plication o f K ahn's notion of prolepsis; if Plato's invention o f th e dialogue genre indicates th e serio u sn ess w ith which he is a t work eliciting th e read er's reflections, so th e m anifold ways he lets various dialogues allude to one an o th er in d icates th e w ay he provides ordered series of occasions for th e developm ent of these reflections. 7Ryle w as evidently th e first to point o u t th a t Socrates' refu tatio n of th e "dream" th eo iy b ears critically on th e form s-see th e b rief discussion of Ryle's (unpublished) p ap er for th e Oxford Philological Society in R.C. C ross' "Logos and Form s in Plato," published in S tu d ies in P lato's M etaphysics, ed. R E . Allen, Routledge, 1965, pp. 14-15 . Against Ryle's view th a t th e refutation bears only p er accidens on the theory of forms, see J . Lesher, "ΓΝ0ΣΙΣ and ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ in Socrates' D ream in th e T heaetetus." Jo u rn al of Hellenic S tudies 89 (1969), pp. 72-78. all, are the three senses of logos related? Are they to be thought as competitors, each excluding th e other two, or as complements? Does the refutation of each remove it from consideration, clearing th e stage for the next, or does it invite u s to consider all three together? Each of these questions bears on the more general question th a t all interpreters of the T heaetetus have to confront: is the dialogue essentially negative, restricted to showing the failure of a set of approaches to the question of what knowledge is, or does it "end well,"8 suggesting, by the light th a t it casts on the failed approaches, ways of rethinking them and the issues they raise th a t might lead to a viable alternative account?
I will divide my exegesis into three parts, corresponding roughly to the order of these questions. We will begin by considering the "dream" theory and the general conception of the object of knowledge th a t Socrates' refutation of the theory seem s to call for; th en we will think through th e three senses of logos and his challenges to them; finally, we will try to work out the "proleptic" force of the passage as a whole.
A. Socrates' Refutation of the "Dream" Theory: The Object of Knowledge T heaetetus first proposes the final definition of knowledge, "true judgm ent with a logos" (201d), as something he has heard from someone else and 'ju s t now" recalls: when Socrates presses him for explication, his recollection proves dim and ha2y, and he asks for help. It is a t th is point th a t Socrates characterizes the proposal as a "dream" and offers to tell Theaetetus "a dream in exchange for a dream."9 But he does not intend to replace Theaetetus' thought with his own; rather, once he completes his statem ent at 202c, he asks Theaetetus w hether it does justice to "the dream" (το ένύπνιον, 202c5) a s he, Theaetetus, h as had it and w hether it "satisfies" him and represents the final definition "in ju s t the way" (τ α ύ τ η , 202c7) he understands it. In this way Socrates m akes clear th at he intends the theory he presents in the "dream" to spell out the final definition as Theaetetus understands it. At the sam e time, when he goes on to ask rhetorically, "...how can there ever be knowledge without logos and right judgm ent?" (202d), Socrates also indicates th a t whatever difficulties Theaetetus' understanding may tu rn out to have, he regards true judgm ent and logos as at least necessary for knowledge.
®This is borrowed from th e title of E.S. H aring's fine study, "The T heaetetus E nds Well"
[hereafter TEWI. The Review of Metaphysics XXXV. 3 (1982) , pp. 509-528. 9,Άκουε δή οναρ ά ν τ ί ό ν είρ α το ς, 201d8. I follow Edward Lee here, who argues in h is exciting (as yet unpublished) essay, "U nderstanding Plato's T heaetetus" (hereafter UPT), th a t S ocrates' offer to exchange dream s is h is w ay o f offering a clarifying in terp retatio n of T h eaetetu s' In outline, the theory in the "dream" ru n s as follows. On the one hand, there are "elements"; on the other hand, there are complexes th a t are composed of these elements. Each of th e elem ents, while "sense-perceptible" (α ισ θ η τ ά , 202b6), is properly subject only to its own nam e and not to any other term or character th a t might be said of or attributed to it. Since a logos is (at th e lea st10) a combination of nam es and since knowledge, by the new definition, requires a logos, the elements are "inexplicable and unknowable." The composites, by contrast, are subject not only to "true judgment" b u t also-since it is possible to give a logos of them by combining the nam es of the elements th a t make them up-"knowable and explicable."
Once he h a s won Theaetetus' approval (202c) of th is theory, Socrates attacks it with a dilemma. As we will see, the dilemma does manifold work, (i) forcing a retraction of what is m ost problem atic in the theory, (ii) confronting u s with a paradoxical directive for rethinking the object of knowledge, and (iii), once we come to recognize th is directive, providing new resources for pursuing it. ft) Retracting the unknowability o f the elements in the "dream" theory. Socrates takes the relation between letters and syllables as the paradigm for the "dream's" account of the relation between elements and complexes. On the one hand, he argues, a syllable may be nothing more th a n "all" the letters (τά π ά ν τ α , 203c5), th at is, the mere aggregate of them. But if so, th en the "dream" theory implies th at for any syllable, one can know all the letters, the mere aggregate of them th a t the syllable ju s t is, without knowing each of them . This, Theaetetus declares, is "a m onstrous absurdity" (203d). Since an aggregate ju s t is each and each and each, etc., of the items th at comprise it, it seems evident th at, as Socrates goes on to say, one m u st "first know" (π ρ ο γ ιγ ν ώ σ κ ειν , 203d8) th e letters before one knows the syllable (203d). B ut th is will defeat the "dream" theory. To avoid this, Socrates swings to the far extreme: a syllable m ay be "a certain unitary form, come to be when the letters are p u t together" (203c); as such, it will both "differ from the elements" (203e) and not have parts (204a, also 205bff.). But if this is so, then, since a logos proceeds by spelling out the p arts of its object, the syllable will be ju s t as incapable of being made the object of a logos-and, so, ju s t as incapable of being known-as the individual letters. In sum , either the elem ents are knowable along with the complexes, or the complexes are unknowable along with th e elem ents (205d-e). In either case, the "dream" theory fails.
Argued th u s, the dilemma is not merely negative. Of its two horns, the second is utterly unacceptable; it would deny the possibility of knowledge altogether. This throw s u s back to 10ln "Knowledge an d Legos in th e Theaetetus" [hereafter KLT], P hilosophical Review LXXXVIII (July, 1979) , pp. 366-397, G. Fine argues persuasively th a t logos m u st m ean n o t ju s t "statem ent" b u t som ething stro n g er like "account" o r "explanation." th e first horn: we m ust affirm th a t the elements are knowable. That he w ants the dilemma to lead Theaetetus to this, Socrates makes clear by the way he follows it up at 206a-c. If T heaetetus th in k s back to his own childhood experience of learning to spell, Socrates points out, he will remember th a t the basic task was to distinguish each element, "itself by itself," in order th a t th eir "placement" together in speech and writing not "confuse" him. Analogously, in studying m usic th e highest achievement was to be able to "follow each note, [recognizing] w hat string it belongs to." In both cases, Socrates claims, "for the complete grasp of any area of learning, elem ents adm it of a knowledge th a t is m uch clearer and more authoritative th an [the knowledge of syllables]" (206b).
(ii) The directive. In having Socrates leave Theaetetus w ith th is conclusion, Plato leaves us with a paradoxical directive for rethinking the structure of the object of knowledge. As we have noted, Socrates indicates at the outset (202d) the necessity of logos for knowledge. And in presenting his "dream," Socrates says th at "the essence of logos is the interweaving of [the] nam es [of the elements]" (202b). Thus logos would seem to presuppose, in its object, wholep a rt stru cture; for logos to explicate something by interweaving the nam es of its elements, th a t 'something' m ust have these elements as, in some sense, its parts. How, then, can Socrates respond to the dilemma by insisting on the knowability of simple elem ents? Evidently, we are asked to retu rn to the simples of the dream and rethink what at first seemed obvious, th a t th eir simplicity precludes them from having the composite stru ctu re th a t being subject to logos requires. Can we conceive, without contradiction, simple elem ents th at are also, as subject to logos, in some sense composite?11 What sort of being, and what sort of compossibility of aspects, needs be thought here?12 11Cf. R. D esjardins' provocative 'T he H om s of Dilemma: D ream ing an d W aking Vision in th e T h e a e te tu s." A ncient Philosophy 1(1981), pp. 109-126; by a different analysis o f th e dilemma, she also arg u es th a t Plato in ten d s to provoke th e read er to accept b o th sim plicity a n d com plexity in th e object o f knowledge. 12Two strateg ies for forestalling th is new directive m ay be se t aside from th e beginning. (1) We m ight try to w ithdraw th e characterization of th e elem ents a s p artless an d tre a t them a s com posites; th u s they would be subject to logos. B ut w hat, now, of their p arts? Are these sim ple?
If not, th e question rep eats itself: w hat of the p arts of these p arts? And so on. T hus we would be engaged in a n infinite regress, an d th e "clearer and more au th o ritativ e knowledge" of th e elem ents th a t Socrates p raises a t 206b would be an illusion. If, on th e Other hand, th e p a rts are simple, th en we m u st eith er accept th e unacceptable claim of the "dream" an d consign them to u n knowability, o r we m u st g ran t them com positeness in some sense as well. B u t th is la tte r is ju s t th e course urged in th e new directive for rethinking th e stru c tu re of the object o f knowledge, an d th ere is no good reason, if we accept it on the level of th e p arts of th e elem ents, n o t to accept it earlier a s well, on th e level o f the elem ents them selves. (2) We m ight reta in th e characterization of a t le a st some level of elem ents as simple b u t rein terp ret w hat it m eans to give a logos of them .
(iW New resources fo r rethinking the object o f knowledge. If we tu rn back to the details of the text with Plato's directive in mind, we find striking resources for developing th is new conception of the object of knowledge. In passing from the first to the second hom of his dilemma, Socrates first elicits from Theaetetus, then suppresses, the discovery of a very sim ilar conception. Consider, first, the elicitation. At 204a Socrates proposes th a t they consider the syllable "a unitary character (μ ία ιδ έα ) th at comes to be out of a set of letters th at fit together." He then adds, "Accordingly, it m ust have no parts." When Theaetetus, surprised, ask s why, Socrates simply asserts th is pre-emptive principle: "where som ething h as p arts, the whole m ust be all the parts."13 That is, the whole m ust reduce to nothing more th an the aggregate of the parts, ju s t the characterization offered in the first hom . But th u s declared, th is seem s quite arbitrary, and Socrates immediately acknowledges the specific alternative it pre-empts: "or do you think th a t it is precisely the whole of the p a rts14 th a t has arisen as a certain unitary character different from all the parts?" This is, in outline, strikingly like the new conception of the object of knowledge we are pondering: a being th at, by virtue of having p arts, is not merely a simple one and yet, by virtue of its unitary character, is not merely the settin g aside th e notion of th e analysis of a whole into its p arts. This is a p a rt of Fine's strateg y in KLT; she argues th a t Plato w ants u s to reconceive logos so th a t it m eans n o t "enum eration of elem ents" b u t ra th e r th e kind of "classificatory" account th a t T heaetetus s ta rts to give a t 203b, an acco u n t th a t tells how th e elem ents w ithin the relevant field b o th differ an d in terrela te w ith one ano th er. Fine tak es th is la tte r so rt of logos to belong to w hat sh e calls "the in terrelatio n al model" of knowledge. B u t I th in k the text discourages u s from distinguishing th is notion of logos from analysis into p a rts an d setting th e two up a s alternatives. F irst, S ocrates nowhere suggests th a t logos needn't be a t least an "enum eration of elements"; th e refu tatio n of th e second sense of logos show s only th a t having su ch a logos is n o t sufficient for knowledge, n o t th a t it is n o t n ecessaiy to it. Second, w hen Socrates m akes th a t refutation, he tre a ts th e "enum eration of elem ents" a s inseparab le from knowledge of th e s tru c tu re by w hich they rela te-th is is m ost explicit a t 208a9-10, w here he says th a t "one is then in possession of the account th a t goes through th e elem ents (την δ ιά σ τ ο ιχ ε ίο υ δ ιέξο δ ο ν), together w ith rig h t opinion, w hen, w riting T h e a e te tu s,' one w rites [the letters] in order (έξης)." It seem s not to occur to him th a t these m ight be tak en a p a rt an d regarded as sep arate "models." Third an d finally, classificatoiy knowledge proceeds by giving distinguishing features, an d these, a s we will see la ter in d iscussing S ocrates' trea tm e n t of th e th ird sen se of logos (and, too, m uch la ter when we come to consider th e language w ith which th e procedures o f collection an d division are presented in th e S ophist an d th e S tatesm an ). Plato conceives a s "parts" of th e definiendum : th u s, classificatoiy knowledge is itse lf a mode of analysis into p a rts.
13My stress. The argum ent requires th a t th is be the "is" of identity. Cf. Fine, KLT, p. 382.
14The "precisely" is my effort to render th e force of the κα! a t 2 0 4 a 8 .
aggregate of its parts.
To preserve his dilemma for Theaetetus, Socrates m ust suppress th is conception; b u t the particular way th a t Plato h a s him do so should make it all the more interesting to u s, a s we ponder the Platonic directive. In effect, Socrates' suppression of w hat he h a s elicited from T heaetetus is Plato's more radical elicitation of it from us. Socrates' key moves are to establish, (1), th a t the aggregate of the items th a t a thing includes (τα π ά ν τα ) is identical with th e sum or, literally, "the all" of them (το π ά ν, 204bl0) and, (2), th a t a whole is identical with th e sum of its p arts in th a t each is alike "that from which nothing is missing" (205a2, 4-5); from these claim s he can establish by substitution his pre-emptive principle th a t a whole is identical with the aggregate of its parts.
Step (1), in tu rn , Socrates establishes by studying "things th a t consist of a number" (το ΐς όσα έξ α ρ ιθ μ ο ύ . 204dl). He begins by taking the num ber 6 as an exemplary "all" (παν. 204c8); the item s it includes, the units, can be articulated in a host of ways-there are the counting-out, ''1,2,3,4,5,6," the m ultiplications "2x3" and "3x2," and the additions "4+2" and "3+2+1." No m atter how the u n its are gathered and grouped, Socrates gets Theaetetus to agree, in each case "the all," the sum or complete collection th at 6 is, is expressed. Should we agree? In fact, Socrates' argum ent highlights the way, if we regard something a s nothing more th an the sum of its parts, we commit ourselves to neglect th e various ways the p arts may be organized. Socrates' example brings out nicely the complementary dim ensions of such organization: the degree to which p a rts are broken down (contrast, for instance, the counting-out, which takes each unit as a basic part, with the m ultiplications, which take 2 and 3 as the basic parts) and the structure of th eir combination (contrast serial order, m ultiplication, addition, as well as, within these, the specific sequences of the numbers). Is neglecting the organization of the p arts objectionable? We might go along, as Theaetetus does, if our attention is limited to "things th a t consist of a num ber."15 But Socrates' next set of examples seems chosen to bring out what Theaetetus apparently m isses, th a t th is is a highly restricted class. Socrates cites acres (204d4-5), miles (204d7),16 and armies (204d9-10) as cases in which the num ber of items a thing includes is identical with the thing. But it is surely one thing to say th a t 5280 feet are identical with a mile and another to say th a t 10,000 soldiers are identical with an arm y.17 This brings out 15O n th e o th er hand, su ch exam ples seem to invite a Fregean sense-reference distinction.
16T hat is, o f course, he cites th e Attic equivalents of these, th e plethron an d th e stadion.
17In h is sum m ative sentence a t 2 0 4 d l0 -ll, Socrates says, ό γά ρ α ρ ιθ μ ό ς π α ς τό δν παν έκαστον α ύ τώ ν έ σ τ ιν ("For th e complete num ber is th e complete thing [or sum o r com plete collection] th a t each of th ese is"). One way to try to minimize th e im m ediate difficulty of th e identify S ocrates is assertin g is to read th is sentence as claim ing only th a t th e com plete num ber is th e sam e a s th e su m or complete collection of th e num erous item s, an d n o t th e sam e a s th e com plete thing th a t h a s these item s. B ut th ere are two problem s w ith this. First, it would m ake th e sum m ative sentence introduce a distinction o f w hich th ere is no trace in th e sen ten ces th a t it w hat Is wrong with step (2) a s well. To know there are 10,000 soldiers in an army may well be to know the whole in th e sense of "that from which nothing"-th a t is, no particular item -"is missing." B ut th is very sense of "whole" omits w hat is m uch more basic, th e "division of labor"18 or organization according to differentiated and co-ordinated functions th a t gives th e plurality of soldiers th e character of a potentially effective fighting force, an army in the genuine sense. This is the true whole, and it is not reducible to the aggregate of its parts.
Still, th is notion of an irreducible whole does not quite satisfy the conditions required to m eet th e Platonic directive. When, at 206a-c, Socrates rem inds T heaetetus of his childhood experiences learning to spell and studying m usic, he stresses the priority of th e knowledge of "elements"-th a t is, of letters and notes-to the knowledge of "syllables"; in th is contrast, the "elements" are the simples th a t make up compounds, and the "syllables" are the compounds made up of these simples. Seen in this context, the example of the army is a compound. Its "unitary character" (μ ία ιδ έ α ), preventing it from reducing to the mere aggregate of its parts, m akes of th is aggregate, instead, a whole. Thus, to put into the sharpest possible focus the difference between w hat the example exhibits and w hat Plato calls for: the army is a composite which h a s a simple and unifying character, not a simple th a t has, in some sense, composite structure.
Recognizing th is, however, is itself a step in the right direction. It should invite u s, reflecting on the example, to focus on the "unitary character." Granted, we encounter it only In the whole, as the imm anent organization according to which the p a rts are determ ined and arrayed.19 Still, is it itself, in its unity, the trace of the simple for which Plato calls? Can we refocus somehow, moving from the composite with a simple character to the character itself as w hat is basic to the composite, in order to m eet the Platonic directive? sum m ates; in presenting th e three exam ples, Socrates says,'T he num ber of an acre is th e sam e as the acre" (204d4-5), 'The [number] of a mile, in th e sam e w a y (204d7), an d "And also, indeed, the [number] of an arm y an d th e arm y, and likewise for all su ch things" (204d9-10). Second, th is reading would only change th e way th e passage functions to suggest the co n trast betw een "things th a t consist of a num ber" an d o th er things, n o t th e co n trast itself. H earing th e w ay th e sum m ative sentence m akes a distinction th a t th e statem en ts of th e exam ples do not, we would be moved to say, Yes, 10,000 soldiers are the sum o r complete collection of th e item s in an army, b u t th is, th e su m o r complete collection, is hardly th e sam e as th e arm y itself!' 18Cf. K. W atanabe, "The Theaetetus on Letters and Knowledge" (hereafter TLK), Phronesis XXXII, 2 (1987), p. 158. 19Thus , th e several appearances of ιδέα (203e4, 2 04al, 205c2, 205d7) and είδ ο ς (203e4, 205d6) refer not to sep arate form s b u t to im m anent ch aracters of concrete things. B u t to say th is is n o t to beg th e question ag ain st th e possibility th a t Plato in ten d s to call to th e read e r's m ind th e notion of sep arate forms.
B. The Senses of Logos: Types of Composite Structure and the Act of Knowing
At 206c Socrates begins the second phase of his attack on Theaetetus' definition of knowledge, turning to the notion of logos and examining three possible senses it might have. On the surface, Socrates rejects each sense and, with them, Theaetetus' definition, and the dialogue ends in aporta. If, however, we recognize in the refutation of the "dream" the Platonic directive for rethinking the object of knowledge, these three senses of logos and the refutations of them contain m uch th a t is helpful. Specifically, the discussions of the second and third senses of logos bring out, under two distinct aspects, the composite structure th at logos and, more generally, knowledge requires in the object. Further, th e discussion of the th ird sense, taken together with th a t of the first, suggests the way simplicity and complexity go together as m utually necessary aspects under which the object comes to light in the act of knowing.
For th is positive content to emerge, it is im portant to keep in m ind th a t Socrates never withdraw s his earlier affirmation th a t logos and right judgm ent are necessary for knowledge (202d). On the contrary, Socrates' refutations, far from showing any of the three senses of logos to be wrong-headed or incompatible with one another, show only th a t each by itself is not enough to raise true judgm ent to knowledge. We are th u s invited to ask, first, what more is needed for knowledge and, second, w hether th is might be provided, at least in part, by combining the several senses.
a. The first sense of logos: the expression of thought in speech Socrates both raises and dism isses the first sense of logos very quickly. Logos, he says, is "making one's thought (τήν α ύ το ΰ δ ιά ν ο ια ν ) m anifest by m eans of vocal sound in the form of nouns and predicates, working up for oneself an image of one's judgm ent in the stream flowing through the m outh, as in a m irror or water" (206dl-4). But, he objects immediately, anyone capable of speech can produce a logos in this sense; if th is is all th a t logos am ounts to, there will be little difference between right judgm ent and knowledge.
Why does Socrates even bother with so dism issable an interpretation of logos? In context, both the interpretation and the refutation m ake im portant points. The interpretation, first of all, distinguishes and ties together "one's thought" and its linguistic expression. On the one hand, "one's thought" does not reduce to its linguistic expression, for th e latter is only an "image" of it. On the other hand, th is "image" plays the crucial role of "mak[ing] one's thought manifest." It is tem pting to hear in th is an acknowledgment of w hat the dialogue itself puts on constant display. When, at the end of the conversation, Theaetetus tells Socrates th a t "thanks to you, I have given utterance to more th an I h ad in me" (210b6-7), he attests to the m aieutic power of speaking-In th is case, responding to Socrates' questions and challenges. The "image" of one's thought in the "mirror or water" of speech enables one to come to 'se e -th at is, to recognize and assess-what one thinks, and this, in tu rn , is itself the beginning of fresh thinking and speaking. At the same time, the refutation m akes clear th a t not ju s t any linguistic expression will do. To preserve the distinction of knowledge from right judgm ent, logos m ust do some distinctive work. The function of the refutation is, then, hardly to deny the necessity of speech; rather, Socrates raises the question of w hat kind of speech knowledge requires. With the second and third senses of logos, in tu rn , Socrates offers the beginnings of an answer.
b. The second sense of logos: distinguishing the elements th a t comprise a thing The second sense is, "in face of the question of what a given thing is, a reply th at goes through the (thing's] elements" (206e6-207al). As Socrates indicates a t 207b, th is is the interpretation of logos intended before in the "dream." Now he offers two worries about w hether logos in th is sense is sufficient for knowledge. Strikingly, however, the illustrative cases by which he explains his worries to Theaetetus raise problems not so m uch about th is sense itself of logos as about ways in which what it really involves m ight be missed. Thus Socrates, even as he seems to set this second sense of logos aside, in fact opens up what it presupposes and requires. ft) How fa r to break down the parts o f something? Socrates' first worry is th a t analysis may be insufficiently radical. Suppose, he asks Theaetetus, we distinguished a wagon into "wheels, axle, chassis, rails, yoke" (207a)? This would be like breaking a neune down into its syllables; it is tru e so far as it goes, b u t genuine gram m atical knowledge requires continuing on to the letters (207b).
Socrates' spelling analogy both raises and veils a deeper question. At w hat level are we entitled to claim th a t we have come to the elements of a thing? How far does the goal of knowledge require u s to go in breaking down the parts? The fact th a t in spelling it is agreed from the beginning th at the letters are the elements (indeed, Plato follows standard Greek practice in using the same word, σ τ ο ιχ ε ίο ν , for 'letter" and "element") should not keep u s from recognizing th e underlying general question: w hat qualifies one level of u n its, rath er th a n another, to count a s elemental? Socrates signals w hat is crucial by the way he first introduces logos in the second sense as the reply to the question of "what" a thing "is" ( r £ ... ε ίν α ι, 206e6-7, cf. 207a5-6). He is explicit to the point of redundancy at 207b-c: one "gives a detailed account" (δ ιε λ θ ε ΐν ) of "the being" or "nature" (τήν ο υ σ ία ν ) of a wagon "by way of' (δ ιά ) its parts, he says, becoming "expert and knowledgeable about the nature (ο υ σ ία ς) of a wagon insofar as one works through the whole, from beginning to end, by way of its elem ents (δ ιά σ τ ο ιχ ε ίω ν τά δλον π ερ ά ν α ν τα )." These form ulations imply, first of all, th a t what counts a s an elemental p a rt depends on the "nature" of the thing in question. More fully, Socrates draws a three-fold distinction: there are the "elements," the "whole" thing which they comprise, and the "nature" of th is whole. The object of knowledge is the "nature": the express form th is knowledge takes, however, is a logos, an account, th at lays out the whole completely ("from beginning to end"), identifying all of its parts. For th is to be the form appropriate for knowledge of the "nature" suggests two key points. First, the "nature" is what is responsible for the thing's having the p a rts th a t it does; th is is what m akes identifying these p arts a way of "giving a detailed account o f the nature." Second, a t least in the context of its causal power, Socrates considers the "nature" to be incomposite; if it were not, if it itself were a whole of p arts, knowledge of it would refer to these parts, not to those of the thing whose "nature" it is.20
In Socrates' language and choice of example, th is passage points back to the refutation of th e "dream" theory and the new conception of the object of knowledge tow ards which it directed us. As with the example of the army, so here with th at of the wagon, Plato puts before u s a whole not reducible to the mere aggregate of its parts. Now, however, in having Socrates nam e the "nature" of th is whole, he goes farther, leading u s back from the character of the whole to w hat is responsible for its being a whole of th is character in the first place. This does seem, as his earlier intim ations did not, to meet the paradoxical requirem ent of a simple th a t is also, in some sense, composite and subject to logos. As w hat first requires th a t specific array of determ inate p arts th a t characterizes, for example, a wagon, the "nature" precedes th is array and these parts; in its form al-causal power, it prescinds from the whole-part structu re it calls for and is, by contrast with the thing which has th is structure, simple. But at the same time, th is is the array and these are the p arts th a t it calls for; in effect, the "nature" expresses itself in the medium of the things th a t have it, and logos, when it discloses the whole-part stru ctu re of these things, thereby brings the "nature" to light. In this indirect way, in the organization it exacts of others, the "nature" is subject to whole-part analysis.
(11) Recognizing the sam e in the different Socrates presents his second worry by raising th e possibility of occasional error. Suppose someone lays out the letters of a word correctly, "writing them down in order" (208a)-without, however, recognizing one of the syllables in th is word when it appears in another? Wouldn't th is show a lack of knowledge? And wouldn't that show th a t giving a correct logos in the second sense is not sufficient for knowledge?
20With th is introduction of th e notion of ο ύ σ ία S ocrates recalls h is m uch earlier characterization, in th e "digression," of th e philosopher's search for th e "nature" (φύσιν, 174al) Socrates builds up to th is point in three steps. Retracing them helps to bring Plato's underlying concerns into focus. (1) Socrates begins with an alm ost formulaic characterization of two complementary forms of occasional error. There is, he points out, (a) the situation in which "one sometimes judges the same to be p art of the same, sometimes takes it to be p a rt of something different"; here one fails to recognize th e difference between two wholes, taking them to have the same part when they do not. There is also (b) the situation in which "one sometimes supposes one thing to be part of the same, sometimes supposes som ething different to be part of it"; here one fails to recognize the sam eness between two wholes, taking them to have different parts when they do not. (207e) (2) He then points T heaetetus back to his childhood experience of learning to spell, and T heaetetus correctly recalls examples of each type of error: the first type, (a), occurred when he p u t the self-same letter sometimes in a syllable to which it belongs, sometimes in a wrong one, while the second type, (b), occurred when he sometimes put the right letter, sometimes the wrong one, into a self-same syllable.21 Note th at had Plato wanted to show only th a t correctly laying out a thing's elements is not enough to assure th at one has knowledge, he might have had Socrates stop here. But he does not. (3) Rather, Socrates goes on to construct a single example of his own. W hat if, as a child, Theaetetus had recognized theta 0 ) and epsilon (e) as the letters m aking up the first syllable of his own name, Θ ε-α ίτη το ς, b u t m istakenly took tau (t) and epsilon (ε) as the letters making up the self-same syllable in the different name Θ ε-όδω ρος? Theaetetus agrees th at even though he could spell Θ εα ίτη το ς correctly, putting down all the right letters in the right order, he shouldn't be credited with knowledge.
Socrates' example involves two interesting departures from steps (1) and (2). First, with no warning or explanation he drops one of the two types of error, (a), turning his attention exclusively to (b).22 This is surprising and should move us, as we think into the example, to ask for an analogous development of (a). Second, he expands Theaetetus' frame of reference in (2): whereas Theaetetus had considered the placement of letters in syllables, Socrates now adds consideration of the placement of self-same syllables in different words. With th is, Plato points to a distinct mode o f logos th at m ust be introduced to complement the work of laying out a thing's elements "in order." To achieve genuine knowledge of a word, Socrates implies, we m ust be able to recognize the occurrences of each of its syllables in other words as well. To bring into focus the new mode of analysis th is suggests, consider these points of difference: w hereas to th is point Socrates' concern has been to get to the level of elemental 21It m ay be helpful to co n stru ct English exam ples for each type of error. For (a), take th e le tte r p and th e syllables p a and ba ; th e m istake would be to say, on one occasion, th a t p is p a rt of p a and th en to say, on an o th er occasion, th a t it is p a rt of ba. For (b), take the letters p a n d b an d th e syllable pa; here th e m istake would be to say, on one occasion, th a t p is p a rt o f p a an d th en to say, on an o th er occasion, th a t b is p art of p a . 22To my knowledge, only A. Neham as, ELP, p. 277, h as noted th is. p arts, now he m arks out an Intermediate level between the whole and its elemental p arts, a level of p a rts composed of these elemental parts, th a t is, the level of syllables, and fixes his attention on these; whereas with the laying out of a thing's elements he h a s not looked beyond th e whole th a t these comprise, now he is concerned to recognize, in other wholes, occurrences of th e sam e interm ediate level parts; finally, whereas the laying out of a thing's elem ents is concerned with the way they fit together within the whole they comprise, now he is concerned to be able to identify, in th e m any different occurrences of its interm ediate level parts, respects in which different wholes are alike. To gather up these implications of Socrates' example in a provisional way: to know what something is in th e fullest sense, he seems to be saying, requires both th a t we can spell out the the array of elements th a t its "nature" exacts of it and th a t we can recognize its kinship, through shared interm ediate level parts, with other th in g s.
With th is, Socrates' neglect of the complementary type of error should become striking. Surely the knowledge of what something is requires recognizing not ju s t w hat it shares with kindred others b u t, too, how it differs from them. Evidently, Plato w ants th is objection, for he now h as Socrates, in introducing the third sense of logos a t 208c, in effect express and develop it.
c. The third sense of logos: telling the features th a t differentiate a thing from everything else
The sense of giving a logos accepted by "most people," Socrates says a t 208c7-8, is "to tell some m ark by which the thing in question differs from everything else." The idea behind th is seem s straightforward at first: by "adding" to one's "right judgm ent" or "opinion" (ορθή δόξα) about something a grasp of what differentiates it from other things, one moves beyond mere opinion to genuine knowledge of the thing; one "will have become knowledgeable of th at of which, beforehand, one had only opinion." (208e)
Socrates attacks th is sense of logos and the new definition of knowledge it yields with an elegant compound dilemma. (1) In stressing the addition {προσλά&ω, 209a2) of the logos of th e difference to one's right judgm ent of the object, the definition implies th a t the "thought"-content (τή δ ια v o it? , 209a8, also b3, b7, cl) of the right judgm ent does not itself include what differentiates th e object from others, hence th at it refers to the object only by way of what it h a s in common with others. But if th a t is so, then the right judgm ent is no more directed at the object in question th an it is directed at other quite different objects, and th is underm ines its very sta tu s as right judgm ent o f that object (2) To avoid this consequence, Socrates gets Theaetetus to agree th a t the right judgm ent of an object m ust include an awareness of what differentiates th a t object from all others. Taking Theaetetus him self as an exemplary object.
he drives the point home by working stage-wise from the common to th e particular. To identify Theaetetus, he points out, it would not be enough to list all the p arts of the hum an body, e.g. "nose and eyes and m outh and so on," for evéiyone h as them (209b); nor would it suffice to give a list of more specific features like "snub-nosedness" and "bulging eyes," for lots of others, including Socrates himself, have these (209b-c) ; rather, ...Theaetetus will not have been made a content of my judgm ent before th is particular snubnosedness (ή σ ιμ ό τη ς α ϋ τη ) has stamped and registered w ithin me a record distinct from all the other cases of snubnosedness I've ever seen-and so too for the other features of which you're comprised (και τ α λ λ α ούτω έξ ών el σύ)-so th at. If I meet you tomorrow, it will stir my memory and give me right judgm ent about you. (209c4-9) B ut th is leads directly to a second dilemma, (a) If, on the one hand, the right judgm ent already includes the very awareness of difference th at the logos is supposed to "add," then the logos adds nothing, and the definition becomes internally redundant, (b) If, on the other hand, one secures the logos' special contribution by interpreting it as a "knowing" of the difference, th en the definition becomes question-begging; knowledge will then be defined as right judgm ent together with knowledge.
(V A second sort o f simplicity and complexity. As we work through Socrates' argum ent, we should be struck by the way it brings u s back-with, however, several significant differences-to the issue of the simplicity and complexity of the object of knowledge. As we've begun to consider, logos in the third sense complements what Socrates called for in his immediately preceding objection to the second sense; where th a t objection implied th a t knowledge of something requires the ability to recognize p arts or features it shares with others, the third sense of logos implies th a t knowledge requires recognition of the different ways things have these parts. Socrates' stage-wise movement through his example leads from the indeterm inate and common to the determ inate and distinctive. Thus, Theaetetus is distinguished, first, from other beings with noses by his snub-nosedness and, secondly, from others who are also snub-nosed by "the particular snub-nosedness" peculiar to him. The same point holds for his peculiar bulging-eyedness and-since he has each of his features with a peculiar determ inateness-"so too for the other features o f which [he is] comprised." With th is language we are returned to the conception of the object of knowledge as, in being subject to logos, a whole of parts: in the example at hand, Theaetetus is thought as "comprised of' (έξ ...) h is various determ inate features, and the task of logos is to work through them. But there are two im portant differences. The first h as to do with the intimacy, so to speak, of the whole-part structure to the object. In examining the second sense of logos, Socrates distinguished the "nature" from the thing th at h as it, and it w as only the thing, not the "nature" itself, th a t logos disclosed as actually having parts; or, to draw th is distinction in a different way, w hereas whole-part analysis revealed the "nature" in its form al-causal power to exact a certain organization of p arts in others, it treated the "nature" in itself, in its own intensional content, a s partless. Now, by contrast, logos trea ts the object itself as composite, a s "comprised of' its various features. Secondly, there is a basic difference in the aim s of the two kinds of analysis and, correspondingly, in the sta tu s of the p arts each works to distinguish. Logos in the earlier sense picks out constituents of the thing as a whole; it selects and identifies p a rts with an eye to the way they fît together, answering to the unifying organization the "nature" exacts. In the present sense, the context is not the relation of p arts to each other within a whole but, rather, the contrast of the whole with other wholes. Logos picks out features th a t differentiate the object as a whole from other generally sim ilar objects; comparing its object with others, it selects parts with an eye to the way these bring to light the uniqueness of the whole they comprise.
With th is new sort of complexity we are led, as well, to a corresponding new sort of simplicity. Socrates' choice of example is very striking. How is it th a t one recognizes another individual? It is not, Socrates' example implies, th a t one spots a single telling m ark, T heaetetus' snub-nosedness, for instance; for "the other features of which [he's] comprised" are also "stamped and registered within me" as "record[s]" of Theaetetus. Nor does Socrates suggest th at one somehow adds all of these up, as if they were distinct bits and the mental operation of recognition were a reassem bling of Theaetetus as an aggregative whole. If one th in k s of the two features Socrates cites, Theaetetus' peculiar snub-nosedness and bulging eyes, it is more n atural to think th at each of these goes with the other, as it were, from the sta rt and th a t for either to "stir the memory" is for it to call to m ind what we might call T heaetetus' peculiar 'look.' This would be th at peculiar bearing or Gestalt by which those who know T heaetetus recognize him 'instantly.'23 On the one hand, this 'look' or Gestalt is not reducible to a catalogue of Theaetetus' various peculiar features; such a catalogue m ust treat them distinctly, one by one, whereas the features themselves, if they perform th eir function as "memory traces," move u s to bring them to mind in their prior unity with one another. On the other hand, such a catalogue can have precisely th is function, calling to m ind, in place of the distinct item s it nam es, the overall Gestalt to which they all belong. There is the fam iliar experience of hearing a sensitive, w ell-attuned description of someone and finding oneself saying. Yes, exactly. That's him to a T!' Socrates' example, then, should lead u s to discover a second fulfillment of the paradoxical requirem ent of a simple th a t is also in some sense composite and subject to logos: on the one hand, the peculiar look* th at is the object of such acts of recognition precedes any 23Note R. M ohr's fascinating reference to su ch recognition on pp. 121-122 of h is "Forms a s Individuals," Illinois C lassical S tudies XI (1986), pp. 113-128. B ut note, too, th e cautionary force of my section C (iii) for th is line of in terp retatio n . analysis into determ inate features; on the other hand, these belong to it, and an account th at tries to recapture th a t 'look* in its uniqueness will select those features th a t are m ost intensely indicative of it. In these respects, the object is, again, simple or partless, preceding the distinctions th a t analysis m akes, and yet, in being suggestible in its uniqueness by way of such descriptions, subject to whole-part analysis as well.
(W Disarming the fin a l dilemma: relating the moments o f the activity o f knowing.
Interpreted in the context of his affirmation of both logos and right judgm ent as necessary for knowledge, Socrates' final dilemma takes on an elicitative function: by showing ways in which, as m om ents of knowledge, logos and right judgm ent cannot be related, it challenges u s to conceive in w hat other ways they are related. Each of the horns, in tu rn , contributes in some definite way. From (1) we learn th at logos and right judgm ent m ust be directed toward and disclose the self-same object; from (2a) we learn th a t they m ust disclose th e object in distinctive ways; and from (2b) we learn th a t logos alone cannot constitute knowledge-it m ust function together with right judgment.
Strikingly, the reflections we have been developing in response to the earlier Platonic directive provide the resources for disarming the dilemma and working out concretely its positive implications; in effect, the elicitative work of the final dilemma dovetails with th a t of the first dilemma, at 202d-205e. For consider together the two sorts of simplicity and complexity th a t have emerged in our study of the second and third senses of logos. In both senses, logos brings the object to light by disclosing a whole of p arts-an ordered set of elemental constituents, in the second sense of logos, and a list of telling features, in the third. Yet we have also seen th at these disclosures answer to and explicate a prior awareness of the object (this would be the moment of right judgment), and in th is aw areness the object is given as simple. The "nature," even while it exacts whole-part structure of the things th a t have it, does not itself have these parts; analogously, the unique 'look' precedes the sorting of its various telling features from one another and so is not reducible to th eir aggregate. T hus right judgm ent and logos do bring the self-same object to light in distinctive ways, th e one disclosing it in its simplicity, the other explicating th is by laying out a plurality of parts; and in th a t logos, in th is explicative function, depends on and answ ers to right judgm ent, it is only together with right judgm ent th at it can constitute knowledge.
Having said this, we should add a major, counterbalancing qualification. Even while logos depends on right judgm ent for the content which it explicates, knowledge depends on logos to show th a t such "judgment," δόξα, is "right" or "true" in th e first place; explication should therefore be understood as a mode of examination. Here the first sense of logos, "making one's thought (διάνοιαν) manifest" in speech, m akes its special contribution to the overall conception of knowledge. How else, short of giving a logos, can we p u t th a t 'thought" to th e test? Short of discursive expression, we are not in position to distinguish, within our own "thought," w hat is genuine insight from w hat is misguided opinion. Even as it answ ers to and depends upon a prior awareness, giving a logos also exposes th is awareness and m akes it subject to critical reflection.
Clearly, both of these relationships of right judgm ent and logos are indispensable to knowledge as a whole. If the first relationship, in which logos expresses a genuine recognition of th e "nature" of a thing, is the consummation of coming to know, the second, in which logos perm its u s to examine an apparent recognition, testing it for adequacy and depth of understanding, is w hat enables inquiry to begin and to move toward consum m ation in the first place.
C. Proleptic Q uestions-Forms. Collection and Division. Insight If our reflections so far are well-taken, then there is, at th e least, pointed Platonic irony when, at 210b, Socrates asks Theaetetus whether their definitions of knowledge have proved to be "mere wind eggs and not worth the rearing (αξία τροφής)." Theaetetus takes this as a rhetorical question and agrees, b u t we have found, both in the original "dream" and in the ways Socrates h as responded to it, a great deal th at is worthwhile. The suggestion th a t it m ust still be "reared," moreover, captures precisely the sta tu s of th is content. The Theaetetus h as given u s specifications, or determ inate conditions, th a t the object of knowledge m ust meet in order to be the object of knowledge; b u t it has left for another occasion the discovery of w hat there is th a t is suited to m eet these conditions. Likewise, it h as indicated the kinds of work th a t logos m ust do in order to help to constitute knowledge; b u t it has left open ju s t what methodological form logos might take in order to do th is work. Finally, it h as left inexplicit the character of the cognitive act th at, filling the role of "right judgm ent" in the final definition, is capable of orienting the work of logos. On these three counts, the T heaetetus is "proleptic," pointing beyond itself and requiring other occasions for the full development of th e reflections it h a s initiated.24 R e c a ll n. 6 above. Would it go too far to bring th e idea of proleptic content together w ith the earlier m etap h o r of th e dream ? For th e G reeks, dream s were traditionally considered vehicles of prem onition. B ut th e co n ten t o f dream -prem onitions w as n o t to be tak en u n critically a t face value-th ere is always th e danger th a t th e dream er, even a s he is tran sp o rted beyond h is ordinary w aking un d erstan d in g , m ight also be fooled by illusion, rem aining asleep, a s it were, to w hat is really a t han d ; hence dream s are in need of probing in terp retatio n . All th is seem s to fit the situ a tio n in th e Ih e a e te tu s . With its notions of simple elem ents, o f a mode o f "true judgm ent" th a t reaches them , an d o f th e key role of logos, S ocrates' "dream" theory is prescient. B ut a s h is su b seq u en t challenges have brought out, each of these notions needs be developed an d com plicated before it can be accepted; only a s clarified by th e reflections th ese challenges occasion, does th e "dream's" prem onitory content come to view. If th is is well tak en , th en the (i) The manifold specification o f the object o f knowledge-and the form s. In the last two sections, we concentrated on the way Socrates' example-Theaetetus' 'look'-points a path through the final dilemma: as the object of right judgm ent, T heaetetus' 'look' both orients and transcends the way it is itself represented in a logos of his features: th u s right judgm ent and logos function together w ithout redundancy. Concentrating on th is aspect of the example, however, we neglected a different, initially puzzling aspect. Theaetetus is a particular person, and recognition of him is recognition of a particular sensible individual. Likewise, the sun, the entity Socrates takes as his example in the passage ju s t preceding a t 208d, is a particular celestial body, and to distinguish it as "the brightest of the celestial bodies th a t go around the earth" is to distinguish a particular sensible individual from others. Can Plato intend u s to take entities of th is kind as proper objects of knowledge? This would be surprising both in itself and in light of Socrates' earlier discussions of the wagon and spelling examples. In the treatm ent of the wagon example, the object of knowledge is the ουσία, the "nature" th a t determ ines the structure of those things th at have it as th eir "nature": and in the treatm ent of the spelling example, in tu rn , the need to be able to recognize the various appearances of the syllable -9e-in other words implies th at knowledge is concerned with these words as instances of the self-same. Both passages imply th at the proper objects of knowledge are u n iv ersals.
In fact, the problem dissolves if we pay strict attention to the specificity of w hat is exemplified in each case. As we noted much earlier, throughout the Theaetetus Socrates holds back from letting knowledge be defined in term s of what it takes as its objects (see 146e); he proceeds, instead, in the contrary direction, letting the object of knowledge take shape as a function of the requirem ents of knowing. This implies th a t the entities Socrates chooses for his examples should be considered not for what they are in themselves b u t rath er for the way they exhibit th a t which the relevant conception of knowledge implies in its object. The wagon example, as we have seen, is particularly well suited to illustrate the notion of giving a logos as laying out a thing's elements, for it presents us, as the object of knowledge, a "nature" th at calls for a specific array of determ inate parts. The -8e-example, in tu rn , brings home th at knowledge requires recognizing th is array and its m ajor stru ctu ral p arts-its syllables, as it were-wherever these appear, with the implication th a t we m ust be able to locate them as self sam e u n its among others, capable of various combinations with various others. If we now interpret the examples of the su n and Theaetetus in the same way, looking at the way they make prom inent in the object th a t which the third notion of logos-giving the differencerequires of it, what stands out is not th a t they are sensible individuals but, rather, th a t each is in its own way something unique. There is only one su n in the heavens, obviously, and dream m etaphor seem s to invite th e discovery an d focusing o f th e proleptic co n ten t of th e final p art of the T heaetetus.
Socrates Is explicit th a t Theaetetus' peculiar features distinguish him "from all other cases ... I've ever seen" (209c, quoted above).2® This is what Socrates' current account of logos calls for. To be able to articulate w hat differentiates an object from everything else requires, of the object, th a t it in fact stands apart from all others. It is th is uniqueness th a t Socrates plays on in taking the su n and Theaetetus as examples.
With th is in m ind, we can find in Socrates' examples a t least three sets of features th a t knowledge calls for in its object. (1) Realty to know w hat something is requires th a t we be able to lay out its elemental p a rts "in order." But the essential whole-part structure of a thing depends on its "nature." As exacting such structure, moreover, th is "nature" itself precedes it. Thus, th e object of knowledge is the simple "nature" th a t exacts determ inate composite stru ctu re of the things th a t have it as their "nature." (2) Really to know what something is requires th a t one be able to recognize different appearances of it as, qua appearances of it, the same. T hus the object of knowledge is not a concrete particular but, rather, the universal of which particulars are appearances. (3) Realty to know w hat something is requires as well th a t the one who knows it be able to differentiate it from everything else. It is appropriate, therefore, th a t the object of knowledge be unique.
Bringing Socrates' examples to focus this way m akes clear th a t we m ust wake up from th e presum ption of th e "dream" (recall αισθητά, 202b6)-a presum ption, moreover, th at h as guided T heaetetus throughout the dialogue-th at the objects of knowledge are sense perceptible.26 More generally, it will m ean accomplishing what Plato elsewhere describes as th e "turning" of th e soul from sensibles to forms.27 This task , however, involves m uch more th a n simply introducing a new m etaphysical entity, for such a procedure would leave in place, untransform ed, the basic habits of thought th at go with taking sensibles as basic; the consequence would be th a t the new entity would be conceived by way of the categories appropriate to sensibles. In the Theaetetus. then, Plato leaves the ta sk of the "turning" of the soul implicit, deferring it for another occasion. That occasion is the Parm enides.28 We m ust reserve the explication of th is claim for another tim e.29 By way of anticipation, however, we 25Peter Lupu h as pointed o u t to me th a t Socrates actually secures th e uniqueness of T heaetetus' 'look' by restrictin g it to th e context o f h is experience. Haring, TEW, p. 517; K. Sayre, P lato's A nalytic M ethod. University of Chicago, 1969, pp. 136-137. 27Republic 518c 28For P lato's indication th a t th e Parm enides constitutes a fu rth er task, related to b u t presupposing more preparation th a n is dem anded by th e T heaetetus. see th e reference in n. 5. 29The m aterial for th is explication, however, is already gathered, w ithout reference to the m ay observe th a t In the hypotheses of the Parm enides Plato offers a conception of the forms th a t dovetails with the conception of the object of knowledge in the T heaetetus. In the Parm enides form s are characterized as the simple and unique "ones" th a t determine, in the things th a t "participate" in th a n , their whole-part structure; moreover, they are taken to be objects of a discourse (λ έγ ειν ) th at, moving between w hat they "are" and "are not," differentiates each from everything else. In these ways, forms are shown to be, in th eir own nature, the same sort of entity th at, in the T heaetetus. knowledge is shown, in its own nature, to require for its object.
(tí) The modes o f logos-and the various form s o f collection and division. From the beginning (recall 202d) Socrates h as treated logos as necessary for knowledge. For logos, in tu rn , he h as disclosed three kinds of work: (1) the laying out, "in order," of a thing's elemental p arts, (2) the identification of respects in which otherwise different things are the same, and (3) th e identification of respects in which generally sim ilar things differ. (2) and (3), we have seen, Socrates takes together as a pair, both in his formulaic statem ent of the complementary kinds of error at 207e and again in the way he follows his illustration of m issed sam eness at 207e-208a by the interpretation of logos as giving the difference at 208c.
By contrast, it rem ains an open question ju s t how (1), the laying out of elemental parts, and (2)/(3), the discerning of sam eness and diifference, fit together. It is also left open w hat specifically methodological forms these several modes of analysis m ight take. For these questions we have to tu rn to other texts. To indicate these, again by way of anticipation: With regard to (2) and (3), the Sophist and Statesm an (up to 287b), following upon the Theaetetus as the second and third m embers of a trilogy,30 introduce the m ethod of collection and division in the mode of bifurcation. (2), the recognition of sam eness, is m ost visible in the initial collection of a heterogeneous plurality under a comprehensive kind, while (3) is accomplished by a series of halvings, beginning with th is comprehensive kind and disclosing narrow er and narrow er kinds until at last we reach one th a t includes only, or coincides with, the definiendum, in fact, (2) also recurs in each halving, for the same p art or feature th a t analysis picks out to differentiate the definiendum from some things also serves to disclose its sam eness with some others.31 With regard to (1), the key text is the Philebus (especially 16b-18d, 23b-27c); there Plato has Socrates take up again the examples of letters (17a-b, 18b-d) and m usical notes (17b-e, also 26a) that, in the Theaetetus. he first invoked a s background for the "dream" (202e ff., 206a-b). In the Philebus. however, he is not primarily concerned with syllables and words (or, by analogy, melodies); instead he focuses, on the one hand, on the whole fields of elements required by the notions of letter and pitch, respectively, and, on thê S e e the passages cited in n. 4. 31See m v The P hilosopher in P lato's STATESMAN [hereafter PPS], M artinus Nijhoff, 1980, ch. II. 1. other hand, on th e proportions of opposites th a t structure the instantiation of each of th e elem ents, determ ining its place in the field. The m ain ta sk of analysis, a s Socrates now explicates it, is to disclose the definite num ber of elements th at, by virtue of the fitness of each for interplay with each other, function as p arts and comprise the field a s a whole.32 With regard, finally, to th e fit of the two m ethods and, so, of the two modes of analysis, there is the intriguing set of non-bifurcatory distinctions in the last p art of the Statesm an (287b-290e, 303d-305e). On th e one hand, these complete the differentiation, of statesm anship from all sim ilar arts; on the other hand, they proceed analogously with th e illustrative analyses of letter and m usical pitch in the Philebus. spelling out the notion of "care for th e city" by distinguishing a fie ld o f elemental parts, the various kinds of art, th a t are fit for interplay. W hat is the significance of th is apparent confluence of the two m ethods? Plato has the Eleatic Stranger first rem ark th a t the reason for giving up bifurcation "will become evident to u s as we proceed" (287c), then rem ain silent on the new form the method of division is taking. This leaves it up to the reader to reflect on the question, and we will attem pt th is in due course.33 (iii) "Right judgm ent"-and the insight that orients logos. At the core of the conception of knowledge th a t emerges from the Theaetetus is the notion of "true" or "right judgm ent." If we ask directly and head-on, ju s t what is the act of mind th at fills the role of "right judgment" in constituting knowledge?, we find th a t Plato leaves th is unthem atized. This is a t least34 because of the dialectical pedagogical strategy of the Theaetetus. Socrates, as we've seen, works from w ithin Theaetetus' presum ption th at the object of knowledge is sense perceptible; hence his last two examples of "right judgment" are the perceptual acts of seeing the su n and recognizing Theaetetus. If our reflections in (i) are well taken, however, his refutations subvert th is presum ption, making clear th a t knowledge requires forms, not sensibles, for its objects. With th is it should also become clear th at "right judgm ent" m ust be an intellectual, not a sense perceptual, recognition and th at Socrates' examples m ust not be taken uncritically. As, in particular, the Parm enides will later show, relying on perceptual acquaintance as a model for insight into forms is one of the key ways in which one fa ils to m ake the "turn" from sensibles to forms.35 on I attem p t to give th is th e su stained exegesis it requires in the p ap er cited in n. 3. 33Again, see the paper cited in n. 3. 34i m u st defer th e deeper question of how fully th is act of m ind can be them atized. See, for in stan ce, S. R osen's discu ssio n of intellectual intuition in A ristotle in The Limits of A nalysis (Basic Books, 1980 ) an d h is capping rem ark on p. 63: 'There is no possibility of a direct dem onstration of th e a c t of in tuition in th e sense of a discursive analysis of th a t act. This is because in tu itio n is th e n ecessary precondition for discursivity and, a s a n act, it h a s no stru ctu re.'' 35See my PP, ch. II. For th e T heaetetus. see Lee, UPT, on the struggle against "the paradigm of p ercep tu al immediacy." Λ* Suppose, therefore, th at we scale back our question, asking not for the essence of the act of m ind th a t Is called "right judgment" but, rather, for Its Junction In knowledge. Here, a s we have seen, th e T heaetetus Is richly suggestive. Moreover, our reflections in (1) and (il) perm it u s to bring some of our earlier analysis Into new focus. To begin with, recall th a t in first discussing Socrates' wagon example, we noticed a kind of gap between the object of knowledge and the way logos brings it to light: logos discloses the "being" or "nature" of wagon by disclosing th e whole-part structure it requires of something else, the things th a t have it as th eir nature; the "being" or "nature" itself, we observed, prescinds from th is structure. Does an analogous gap show up between the object and the way it is brought to light by a logos th at spells out its sam eness and difference with others? The object, we have seen, is unique. But, a s Socrates showed by his stage-wise movement from the indeterm inate and common to th e determ inate and distinctive at 209b-c, to pick out features th a t distinguish som ething from other things is also to bring the several things to light in term s of w hat they share; to single out Theaetetus* 'look,' for instance, by naming his "particular snub-nosedness" is, even while calling up th a t unique 'look,' to speak what Theaetetus shares with lots of others, snub nosedness. T hus the logos discloses what is itself unique in term s th a t also apply to something else; it represents the object not as it is in itself b u t a s it is in relation to others. Does th is gap between object and logos suggest the unknowability of the object and, so, the impossibility of knowledge? If our interpretation of the nonredundancy of right judgm ent and logos is well taken, the answer is no. On the contrary, the gap is filled by the insight or aw areness th a t orients logos. At its best, logos explicates a prior recognition of a simple and unique nature. To reverse our formulation of a few sentences ago: even while logos speaks of th a t n atu re as it is in relation to others, it calls it up in its uniqueness, as it is in itself. Indeed, a m easure of the excellence of a logos is how fully it answers to and brings to mind the very presence th at transcends it. So, at least, the closing aporiai of the Theaetetus seem to suggest. Are these suggestions "reared" elsewhere? Three texts, in particular, w arrant special attention. First, in the Parm enides there is a striking distinction between the characterizations of "the one" in the first and the fifth hypotheses: in the first hypothesis, "the one" is considered ju s t in itself as a one and held not to be subject to sam eness and difference; in the fifth hypoothesis, by contrast, it is considered as the object of logos and held to be subject to sam eness and difference.36 If I am right to understand "the one" in these passages to refer u s to each one form,37 th en Plato is giving u s occasion to distinguish the form as it is in and of itself, as the one nature th a t it essentially is, and the form as logos, with its necessary reliance on relations, explicates it. This distinction appears to be reiterated in the Sop h ist. At 255e the Eleatic Stranger m akes the striking rem ark th a t "each [form] is different from the others not 36See 139b-e (discussed in my PP, ch. IV.C.l) and 160c-163b (PP, ch. V.B.2). 37See my PP, ch. Ill, ch. IV.B; and ch. V.B, by virtue of Its own nature (ού διά τήν αύτοΟ φύσιν) b u t because it partakes of the form of difference." It is specifically In term s of its difference from others th a t the favored m ethod of logos in th e Soohist. collection and bifurcatory division, defines each form. Both of these texts th u s describe the gap between the object of knowledge and the way logos discloses it th at the Theaetetus suggests. Is there, then, text to show the way right judgm ent-as, at its best, insight into the "natures" of things-fills th is gap? For this, we need to examine the practice of dialectic in the Sophist and the Statesm an-the latter in particular, for there Plato h as th e Stranger indicate th a t th eir particular inquiry is structured in order to serve as an example of inquiry generally.38 Especially in light of the confluence of the two m ethods of analysis a t the close of the Statesm an, a confluence called for, presumably, by the "nature" th a t is under study, it is tem pting to wonder if Plato is there offering u s an exemplary display of orienting 39 insight at work. 38See my PPS, 39One furth er text is the Seventh L etter. 341b-344d. For a first indication of its relevance and, too, of its connection w ith th e Statesm an, see my PPS, 
